Lesson from the past; the failed 1972 invasion of Uganda.
September 17th is a normal day in the Ugandan calendar, but 48 years ago, it was the day that about 1300 Ugandan fighters assisted by few Tanzanians decided to attack Uganda. Their aim was to attack Uganda and ignite a local revolt that would end the Idd Amin regime. But as history shows, their plan failed and exposed differences among the political groups fighting Amin, differences that would haunt Uganda for years to come. Unfortunately for the Ugandan population, the failure of the invasion led to an increased purge of people by the regime to levels that had never seen before and worsened already volatile relations between Tanzania and Uganda and over time sowed the seeds for the 1978-79 Uganda Tanzania war.
The plan, strategy and the major players.
On the 25th January 1971, Idd Amin seized power in a bloodless coup while president Obote was in attendance at a commonwealth summit in Singapore. Amin who was on Obote`s blacklist was to be arrested on the orders of president Obote upon his arrival from Singapore. Though as history would state, the tables turned on the president. Upon his removal, Obote fled to Tanzania where he was eventually joined by other Ugandan exiles fleeing the regime. Most of those who joined Obote in Tanzania where former public servants, ex-military officers and Obote`s tribesmen, the Langi who become target no. 1 of the new regime. President Nyerere didn’t recognise Amin as the new head of state, publically stating that Obote who was in his country is. The friendship between Obote and Nyerere didn’t just blossom due to their strong pan African interests but also due to their strong socialist ideology of the 1960s. Obote`s move to the left or commons man’s charter did draw similar comparisons to Nyereres Ujaamas policy.
The major players in the invasion were a group of Obote loyalists comprising of former soldiers and public servants. This group would be known as kosi Maalum and its prominent members were Gen.Tito Okello, Brig. Oyite Ojok and Gen. Bazillo Okello all whom who later play a big role in post Amin Uganda. The other group was a small revolutionary group camped at Bukoba and was led by a former assistant researcher in Obote`s office ,Yoweri Musenvi. This group would later be known as Front for National Salvation FRONASA. A total of about 1300 men were assembled, trained and provided ammunition mainly by Tanzania. The invasion was to take place on two axes according to Prof Moses Apedunal, a historian at Makerere University. There was the Mbarara-Fort portal axis that was to be under the Musenvi group and the other one ,was the Kyotera Masaka Kampala axis that was under kosi maluum.
The other route of attack was through Entebbe, but the plane that was to be used got a tyre puncture and the plan was abandoned. The route was intended to attack Entebbe, seize the airport and head for Kampala. The strategy of the attack was to out run the army barracks at Mbrarara and Masaka pick up more ammunition and ingnite the masses to cause a popular revolt that would eventually lead to the fall of the regime. According to Obotes autobiographical interview with Andrew Mwenda in 2004, the former president claimed that Musenvi had assured the fighters of support from the local population and that president Nyerere had believed the intelligence. On paper, the local revolt strategy looked good on paper, but in reality it was a gateway to failure for the invasion. Obote and his team had underestimated Amin`s grip on the population by 1972. By 1970, Obote was hugely unpopular in most parts of the country especially those with a strong cultural leadership like Buganda, Bunyoro and Tooro. Exception was Ankole, were the majority Bairu were pleased with end of rule of the minority Hima dynasty. Secondly, Obotes drastic move to the left angered the British and Israelites who had a significant presence in Uganda. These two countries later played a role in his removal and for the early years, provided intelligence and arms to the state something Amin would use to his advantage to the rebels.In addition, Amins popularity by 1972, was on a high, he had returned the body of Sir Edward Muteesa ii making him appreciated by the Baganda, chased the Asians that were exploitative to the common man and released prominent political prisoners like Bendicto Kiwanuka who he later made chief justice. But greatest hindrance to the local revolt strategy was the fear instilled by the military to population, this fear and coupled with loyalty of the army proved efficient in defeating the invading soldiers and capturing those that had mingled into the population.
©rugaba.
